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Abstract—Modern vehicles contain scores of Electrical Control
Units (ECUs) that broadcast messages over a Controller Area
Network (CAN). Vehicle manufacturers rely on security through
obscurity by concealing their unique mapping of CAN messages
to vehicle functions which differs for each make, model, year,
and even trim. This poses a major obstacle for after-market
modifications notably performance tuning and in-vehicle network
security measures. We present ACTT: Automotive CAN Tok-
enization and Translation, a novel, vehicle-agnostic, algorithm
that leverages available diagnostic information to parse CAN
data into meaningful messages, simultaneously cutting binary
messages into tokens, and learning the translation to map these
contiguous bits to the value of the vehicle function communicated.
Index Terms—Controller area network (CAN), Reverse Engi-
neering, DBC Signal, Tokenization, Regression
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Modern vehicles rely on dozens to greater than a hun-
dred electronic control units (ECUs), embedded computers
that send periodic messages to orchestrate sub-component
functionality, including life-critical services, such as brakes.
ECUs broadcast messages over a Controller Area Network
(CAN), which defines a lightweight protocol that is efficient
and functionally sound, but lacks security measures such as
authentication and encryption [1]. After-market efforts in-
volving modern vehicles, e.g., performance tuning or adding
security measures, usually require the ability to interact with
and understand the data sent over this in-vehicle network.
The CAN 2.0 specification defines aspects of the physical
and data link layer, particularly the CAN frame format,
which is standard across all implementations, and is publicly
available [2]. CAN frames (depicted in Figure 1) have several
components but there are only two important components to
understand the frame—the arbitration ID (AID), which is used
to identify the packet as well as determine priority, and the
data field, containing up to 64-bits of message contents.
However, unlike the open specification of the physical and
data link layer, the full specification of how to decode the
data field is completely proprietary; it is held secret by the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and varies per make,
model, year, and trim. This proprietary information is gener-
ally stored in a .dbc file format (database for CAN). DBCs
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Fig. 1: Image from Cho & Shin [3] of CAN 2.0 data frame. Arbitration ID
used for indexing and prioritizing the packet, which contains a 64 bit data
field or message.
contain (1) signal definitions, which describe the following:
the segment position (start and end bit indices); the binary-
to-decimal encoding scheme (signed vs. unsigned, little vs.
big endian); and the conversion information for translating
the decimal into a meaningful physical value (offset and scale
factor, units, and range of possible values). The DBC also
includes (2) message timing attributes with information such
as transmission frequency (how often message with particular
AID is sent), whether this rate is constant or triggered by an
event, etc., and (3) the ECU that sent the message. Nearly all
after-market modifications or research on passenger vehicles
requires and critically relies on reverse engineering some of
the information held in the DBC. For example, much of current
CAN intrusion detection research is based on data-driven
approaches to determine (2) AID message timing (e.g. [4, 5])
or (3) ECU identification (e.g. [3, 6]), by leveraging physically
observable characteristics, namely message timestamps and
voltage (physical layer).
A. Problem Statement
Fig. 2: 64-bit CAN Message Descrip-
tion defined in DBC: signals depicted
in color with unused bits depicted
in white. Produced by DBC editor
CANdb++ (www.vector.com/candblib).
However, reverse engi-
neering (1) the signal def-
initions is a significantly
more difficult problem than
(2) and (3). One can mon-
itor and send CAN pack-
ets, but understanding how
to translate the data field
information to what it en-
codes is not currently pos-
sible. An example of a fully
defined message with signals shown in color is depicted in
Figure 2, which was produced by software for editing DBCs.
The problem of defining a group of signals held in a 64 bit
data field is two-fold:
1) Tokenization: segmenting message contents into tokens,
contiguous sequences of bits, that constitute a single signal
(determining start/end bit, binary encoding scheme)
2) Translation: converting the token into a number and un-
derstanding its meaning in terms of the vehicle’s function,
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e.g. front left wheel speed, brake light on, etc. (determining
offset, scale factor, units, value range)
Thus, a signal is a token paired with a meaningful mapping,
or translation.
B. Vehicle Information & Diagnostics
While tokenizing and translating CAN signals is not readily
available for passenger vehicles, other ground-truth vehicle
information has been leveraged. Some research opts for hand-
labeled drive states (i.e accelerate, reverse, key in, speedometer
reading of 20mph, ect.) [7–9], while others used external data
loggers [10].
One particularly good source of data is automotive diag-
nostic data. Vehicles manufactured in 2008 or later have an
on-board diagnostic (OBD-II) port, allowing for open access
to automotive networks, and mandated for state-wide emission
testing and diagnostics by the J1979 standard. Automotive
diagnostics exist separately as an application layer for CAN
implementations—for diagnostic actions, the application layer
is called the Unified Diagnostic Service (UDS). UDS exists
as a request-response system in which ECUs respond to
interrogation regarding a variety of vehicular states. One can
query for data such as engine speed, wheel speed, oxygen
sensor readings, each corresponding to a particular Diagnostic
OBD-II PID (DID), for which units, ranges, and conversion
formulas are public [11]. Importantly, these CAN signals exist
in addition to the normal CAN traffic which the vehicle uses
for critical functions, although both are seen in the same data
stream. Further, this serves as a reliable way to obtain ground-
truth data without the need for exogenous data streams.
C. Related Works
Recent research is emerging to provide solutions for signal
extraction from passenger vehicle CAN data fields. Related
works either attempt unsupervised tokenization of CAN data
frames or leveraging diagnostic data, but not directly for
extracting CAN signals.
Markowitz & Wool [12] work toward anomaly detection
on CAN data, including a method to tokenize CAN data and
provide high-level categorization of these tokens (akin to part-
of-speech tagging tokenized text data). Focusing on reverse
engineering automotive CAN data, Marchetti & Stabili [13]
refine the algorithm of Markovitz and Wool [12], define the
semantic categories more rigorously, and test the the method
results against a DBC they acquired. Neither works give ex-
plicit mappings of CAN message segments to their meanings,
but do provide an unsupervised method for tokenization and
semantic categorization. Concurrent work by Nolan et. al. [14]
develops a similar method for unsupervised tokenization of
CAN data frames, based on bit flip probabilities. The elegant
method simply partitions the 64-bit message frames into
appropriately sized segments.
Similar to our approach, previous works have focused on
leveraging UDS data as ground truth for analysis, e.g., [15–
17], although they did not address the explicit problem of
CAN data interpretation. Li et al. [17] presented an IDS
that used a regression model to learn relationships between
physical values, such as vehicle speed, and raw CAN data,
whereas Wasicek et al. [16] develop an IDS based solely on
anomalies in diagnostic data correlations. Neither address the
problem of actual semantic analysis, and both would require
UDS commands to be fired continually during training and
IDS deployment.
Huybrechts et al. [10] is the only previous work that applied
UDS annotations towards CAN data translation. They devel-
oped an “arithmetic method” that attempts to label sections
of data fields based on similarity to simultaneously collected
diagnostic data. However, they did not address tokenization,
instead considering segmentation by one- or two-byte tokens
(a shortcoming of their method that they acknowledge), and
they provide no explicit linear mapping to translate segments
to real physical values.
D. Contributions
We provide a workflow for collecting CAN data alongside
available diagnostic information and a novel algorithm, ACTT:
Automotive CAN Tokenization and Translation, the first algo-
rithm to bring together these previously separate streams of
research. The contributions are as follows:
• ACTT uses diganostic labels to learn CAN signal definitions,
including the parameters needed for tokenization (start/end
bit, endianess) and translation (offset, scale factor, units,
value range).
• ACTT furnishes goodness-of-fit scores allowing visibility
into what diagnostic codes are directly encoded in CAN
data, and allowing discovery of CAN signals that are related
but not directly accessible via diagnostic codes (e.g., accel-
erator depressed indicator). Furthermore, the scoring permits
quantifying the percent of the CAN data field translated.
• ACTT provides a tuneable parameter that on one extreme
forces extraction of only near-perfect diagnostic signals
while on the other provides less exact matches clustered
by their correlations.
E. Impact
Our work also will aid other streams of related research,
providing a preprocessing step and allowing them to refine
and more rigorously test their methods. Due to the difficulty of
extracting CAN signals, many current vehicle research efforts
have avoided fully and explicitly determining these signals.
One workaround for this was to manually reverse engineer a
few single-function signals in CAN data, e.g., [8], in order to
provide proof of concept. Others implemented machine learn-
ing methods (Hidden Markov Models, Neural Nets, Manifold
Learning, etc.) that implicitly learn relationships between raw
binary data and vehicular states [7–10, 16–18].
The features used in these machine learning methods were
often based on unprincipled decisions regarding tokenization,
e.g., considering each byte pair in the data field to be a “sig-
nal”. Additionally, supervised methods required vehicle states
that were often hand labeled, or relied on other exogenous
data sets. Our work therefore provides a preprocessing step
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for these methods that previously employed these brute force
reverse engineering techniques, brittle tokenization schemes,
or manual labeling of vehicle states.
For after market tools, knowledge of signal definitions has
been shown to be very beneficial in various streams of re-
search. Heavy-duty vehicles’ CANs follow the J1939 standard
[19], which is not proprietary and is like a standardized DBC
for all trucks. This largely facilitates rapid development of new
features which can be vehicle agnostic. An example of cross-
platform integration made possible by the J1939 standard is
the Bendix Wingman Advanced which brings adaptive cruise
control with braking features along with collision mitigation
technology to a variety of trucks1. For passenger vehicles,
Ford has developed an open source API called OpenXC, which
includes a small sample of signal definitions. This has resulted
in a wealth of research by individuals creating add on tools
such as ‘OpenXCThenThat’, a vehicular task automator, and
‘Smart Battery App’, an EV battery optimizer based on terrain,
both created during the Ford Electrified Vehicle Hackathon, an
event meant to show off the potential of OpenXC2.
Overall, the inability to comprehend passenger vehicle CAN
data fields severely limits the range and effectiveness of after-
market vehicle research and engineering. Finding vehicle-
agnostic methods for syntactic and semantic understanding of
CAN data fields promises a wealth of opportunity for after-
market development.
II. ALGORITHM
We assume we have a CAN capture from a vehicle during
a sufficiently long driving period to exercise most variation in
the CAN data. Here we define the notation for representing the
64-bit payloads for an AID over time, and then our algorithm
for tokenization and translation.
Let X ∈ {0, 1}n×64 be an AID trace, a sequence of n
time-ordered 64-bit messages from the same AID, where Xij
denotes the bit j in the ith message of the sequence, and
messages occur at times [t1, . . . , tn].
Let y ∈ Zm be a Diagnostic trace, a sequence of m integer
responses from the same DID, where messages occur at times
1www.bendix.com/en/products/acb/wingmanadvanced 1.jsp
2http://openxcplatform.com/
Algorithm 1 Token Preprocessing
function CATEGORIZEBITS(X)
B0, B1, Bused ← ∅
for j ← 0, . . . , 63 do
if Xi,j = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n then
B0 ← B0 ∪ {j}
else if Xij = 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , n then
B1 ← B1 ∪ {j}
else
Bused ← Bused ∪ {j}
return B0, B1, Bused
function GETVALIDTOKENBOUNDRIES(B0, B1, Bused)
V ← {[js, je] | js, je ∈ Bused and js ≤ je and [js, je]∩B0 ∩
B1 = ∅}
return V
[s1, . . . , sm]. Note that unlike for AID traces, whose lengths
can differ significantly based on priority and transmission
rates, all diagnostic traces should be about length m. We note
that we do not include constant diagnostic responses, that is
DID traces s.t. y(si) = c ∀i = 0, ...,m are not considered.
For i = 1, . . . , n, and 1 ≤ js ≤ je ≤ 64, we define the little-
endian (ending bit, je, is most significant bit) and big-endian
(starting bit, js, is most significant bit) integer encodings of
the bit subsequence [Xi,js , . . . , Xi,je ] as, respectively,
L(i, js, je) =
je∑
j=js
Xi,j2
j−js (1)
B(i, js, je) =
je∑
j=js
Xi,j2
je−j . (2)
Our algorithm consists of three main components: (1) Token
Preprocessing, (2) Diagnostic Matching, (3) Message Packing,
discussed below and described in Algorithms 1, 2, and 3,
respectively.
A. Token Preprocessing
We first examine the bits in each AID trace X and catego-
rize each into: a constant 1s bit, a constant 0s bit, or a ‘used’
bit. We note that it is impossible to differentiate between a bit
that is defined to be held constant as a buffer between signals
(an unused bit) and a bit that is simply unchanged during data
collection due a state not being reached in the CAN capture
under investigation. Letting B0, B1, Bused denote the sets of bit
positions, we can then determine the set of possible valid token
boundaries V (see Algorithm 1). We consider valid tokens to
be any contiguous set of bits that does not include a constant
bit. Note that we have defined start and end bit indices js, je
to be inclusive (i.e. js = je indicates a 1-bit token).
B. Diagnostic Matching
We next determine whether any valid token of an AIDs
64-bit data field is related to a diagnostic response message
in Algorithm 2 by converting a time-varying sequence of bit
strings to a sequence of integers, then regressing to see if they
linearly fit any time-varying diagnostic sequence collected.
The first step is to determine the integer translation for each
valid tokens string (from Algorithm 1 which returns set V of
possible start and end bits, [js, je] of a non-constant token). We
consider both little- and big-endian unsigned encodings, but do
not consider any alternative encodings at this time (e.g. signed
binary, one’s complement, two’s complement). Specifically, for
each time index i, we convert [Xi,js , . . . , Xi,je ] (a sequence
with each element a vector of bits) to two sequences of integers
using Equations 1 & 2.
For each of these endian encoding of the token trace, say
x = [x1, ..., xn], we use linear regression to find constants
transforming x to each diagnostic trace y = [y(s1), ..., y(sm)];
of course, we first interpolate the token trace x = [x1, . . . , xn]
to the m diagnostic time points [s0, . . . , sm] giving x˜ =
[x˜1, . . . , x˜m]. The regression furnishes the coefficients a, b that
3
Algorithm 2 Diagnostic Matching
function MAKEINTEGERS(X, (js, je), Endianness)
for i← 1, ..., n do
if Endianness = ‘little-endian’ then
xi ←∑jej=js Xi,j2j−js
else
xi ←∑jej=js Xi,j2je−j
x← [x1, . . . , xn]
return x
function COEFDETERM(y, yˆ)
Stot ←∑(yi − ave(y))
Sres ←∑(yˆi − yi)
R2 ← 1− (Sres/Stot)
return R2
function LINEARFIT(x,y)
x˜←INTERPOLATE(x,y)
( Denote x = [x1, . . . , xn], y = [y(s1), . . . , y(sm)] and
interpolate over diagnostic times: x˜ = [x(s1), . . . x(sm)] )
Find best fit yˆ{a,b}: mina,b ‖ax˜+ b− y‖22
R2 ←COEFDETERM(y, yˆ{a,b})
return R2, a, b
function MATCHTRACES(X,V,y, α)
for (js, je) ∈ V do
for Endianness← [‘little-endian’, ‘big-endian’] do
x← MAKEINTEGERS(X, (js, je), Endianness)
R2, a, b← LINEARFIT(x,y)
if R2 ≥ α then
M ←M ∪ {(js, je, Endianness,R2, a, b)}
return M
results in the best linear fit yˆ{a,b} = ax˜+b to y. Note that we
choose to interpolate over the m diagnostic points because this
is sampled at a much lower rate than AID messages occurring
in normal CAN traffic. We then score each model using the
coefficient of determination, R2 (see Algorithm 2 for formula),
and add the token to our match set M if the score exceeds a
set threshold α. Recall R2 ∈ (−∞, 1] with R2 = 1 indicating
perfect fit, and R2 = 0 indicating fit of a horizontal line.
There are several important things to note about the match-
ing algorithm. Firstly, the goodness of fit for each model gives
more than just a score of how well the model performs, but an
indication of whether the token actually encodes the diagnostic
signal. In some cases it indicates that the CAN token is not an
exact match, but does encode a correlated signal, e.g., we have
identified 1-byte tokens with high correlation to a continuously
changing DID, presumably a binary indicator. Hence α can be
tightened to isolate near-perfect encodings, or tuned down to
discover multiple related signals to each DID.
Secondly, we get both the tokenization (AID, start and
end bits [js, je]) and the actual mapping (a, b, endian-ness)
needed to translate the binary message to the decimal value.
Note that in order to get the true value measuring a physical
signal, including units, we must apply the conversion for the
matched diagnostic response, a formula accessible for these
standardized DIDs [11]. We note that changing α can change
the token boundaries, due to the fact that the algorithm is
simultaneously learning both tokenization and translation.
Thirdly, the scoring mechanism is quite flexible. It can be
Algorithm 3 Message Packing Algorith/Score: Modeling to-
ken packing as a weighted interval scheduling problem, this
can be solved using dynamic programming in O(n log n)
assuming first sorting by end-bit index je.
function FINDOPTIMALPAYLOAD(M )
Following [20] find and return max and argmax of
(1/64)
∑
T R
2(je − js + 1) : T = {(js, je, R2, ·) ∈ M |⋂
[js, je) = ∅}
easily altered to consider other binary encodings, more flexible
regression, or other time-varying observations in addition to
the DIDs.
C. Message Packing
We now have candidate tokens and their mappings, but it
is possible for these learned tokens to overlap, (e.g., the token
comprised of bits 2 to 8 map to a DID with a high fit and the
token comprised of bits 1 to 4 map to a different DID with
a high fit), leaving a problem of deciding which to choose
for each AID. The final section of the algorithm approaches
this problem by determining the optimal packing of matched
tokens for each AID data field. The goal is to essentially create
as full a DBC data field description as seen in Figure 2 as
possible, choosing the tokens with high goodness of fit to a
DID and preferring longer tokens to shorter. For a given match
set from M , we scale the coefficient of determination, R2, by
the token length je−js+1 and then optimize the sum of these
scores over non-overlapping matched tokens (see Algorithm
3). While we do not provide the full algorithm, we note that
this does not require an exponential-time algorithm—the glob-
ally optimal solution can be found in O(n log n) time using
dynamic programming (see [20] for full weighted interval
scheduling dynamic programming algorithm).
We refer to the maximum of the sum in Algorithm 3 as the
message packing score taking values in [0, 1]. Note that if all
64 bits are used by tokens matched with perfect fit (R2 = 1),
then the score is 1. Observing this score over the percent of
non-constant or ‘used’ bits gives a measure of how successful
the tokenization and translation process is. Examples provided
in Results Section.
III. RESULTS
We tested our method on three vehicles dated 2008, 2015,
2016 of two different makes, three models, and using both
gasoline and hybrid. For this short paper we present results
and examples from a 20 minute capture from a 2008 gasoline
vehicle in city and highway driving conditions. CAN traffic
was captured using a Kvaser Leaf Lite V2 (www.kvaser.com)
providing CAN-to-USB translation to a Linux OS laptop
using SocketCan software (https://elinux.org/Can-utils). This
particular car used 25 AIDs and responded on 31 DIDs, which
were queried at a rate of 20Hz throughout the capture. OEMS
are only required to have their vehicles respond to a subset
of about 200 possible DIDs, and for the cars we tested, we
found similar subsets of about 30-45 responsive DIDs. We
note that we obtained similar, if less comprehensive results
for all vehicles tested (2015, 2016 cars had about two times
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as many AIDs) and that results were similar across multiple
captures. We ran the tokenization and translation algorithm
with α = 0.50.
We look at three examples of mapped AID traces for this
capture to illustrate results, shown in Figure 3. Note that the
AIDs are anonymized by replacement with their priority ranks
(highest priority AID1, lowest is AID25). The DIDs are the
actual OBD-II PIDs corresponding to the documentation [11],
and we have translated both the DIDs and mapped CAN tokens
to the appropriate units. Note additionally that although all
token boundaries in the shown examples are constant bits, this
is not always the case.
Figure 3a presents a fully mapped message, that is, every
bit is either constant or matched. The two matched tokens
have very high match scores giving strong evidence that these
two are exactly the signals reporting “Engine RPM” and
“Accelerator Pedal Position D” DIDs, respectively. Note the
single outlying orange point at ≈ 150s, an artifact of the
differing sampling rates.
Figure 3b shows a very high priority message, AID3, which
is nearly identical to AID4. Both contain two 12-bit tokens
that are the signals for “Vehicle speed” DID. Based on our
experience working with CAN data, we can quickly identify
these as encoding wheel speed—likely for all four wheels,
two on each AID3 and AID4. We note that the values of the
linear coefficients, a ≈ 1/100, b ≈ 0 shows these signals
are simply the scaled speed encoded with higher precision
in the CAN data than DID responses. Compare this to the
coefficients in Figure 3a, whose message scores and visual
match are similarly high, but the coefficients indicate a more
complex conversion. The two constant 1s bits in byte 6 of
Figure 3b are likely flag tokens (that do not flip states during
the course of the capture) corresponding to the state of each
wheel. The final half byte of the message is an unmatched
token (shown with -1s). However, visual inspection of the
token plot (bottom) show values vacillating between the 4-bit
minimum (20 = 0) and maximum (23−1 = 15) over a regular
period, revealing that it is a Counter Token. The characteristics
of Counter Tokens, as well as Checksum Tokens, are described
in [13] and are apparently added to prevent particular types of
attacks in safety-critical messages (e.g., injections or replay
attacks). We note that many of our unmatched tokens may
correspond to these Counter or Checksum Tokens. While our
algorithm does currently not account for these, they are easy
to identify, and we plan to identify them initially along with
the constant bits in future iterations.
The message in Fig. 3c demonstrates the point that a lower
score does not necessarily indicate poor performance, but sim-
ply a correlated signal. It also illustrates why it is reasonable
for a single DID to match more than one AID token. For
example, the first and third token in this message match DIDs
that are matched with a higher score in 3a. The single-bit
token matched to DID73: “Accelerator Pedal Position D” has
only a 0.53 match since only 53% of total variance of the DID
signal is explained by the one bit. However, it seems clear that
this bit encodes whether or not the gas pedal is depressed—an
Fig. 3: Examples of mapped messages for three AIDs. Maps similar to DBC
layout in Figure 2 shown with colored adjacent bits showing matched tokens
annotated with matched DID. Constant 0s and 1s bits are shown in grey
and black respectively. Plots of each matched and unmatched token are also
plotted for the first 5 min of each trace. For matched tokens, AID token values
yˆ{a,b} are plotted at diagnostic time points in matched color on top of the
diagnostic curve y. Score, coefficients, a, b, endianness (see Algorithm 2) is
also given. Unmatched AID tokens are plotted in black at AID time points.
(a) AID18: Fully mapped lower priority
message encoding Engine RPM (DID12) and
Accelerator Pedal Pos. (DID73) in the last
three bytes. The top three bits in byte five are
unused, likely because we did not go fast
enough to get near maximum RPM. The high
match scores (> .98) reflect the almost
perfect fit seen by visual inspection.
(b) AID3 (identical to AID4): Bytes 2-3, 3-4
encode vehicle speed (DID13). This is in fact
wheelspeed for two wheels (AID4 encodes the
other two). The last nibble is unmatched, but
by visual inspection this is clearly a 4-bit
Counter used to defend against injection and
replay type attacks. Annotated open DBCs
(https://community.comma.ai/cabana/) indicate
that it is common to have a 4-bit Counter
ending a safety critical message.
(c) AID10: Matched tokens found in this
message are (with the exception of final
DID74 match) are signals that are likely
correlated to the matched DID, but not an
exact match. This is reflected in the
significantly lower scores. Compare orange
and light blue signals to those in 3a. In 3c
(top) the single bit mapped to DID73 seems to
be a binary signal indicating whether the gas
pedal is pressed.
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indicator unavailable via diagnostic query, but easily derived
from pedal angle. Likewise, the third matched token is likely
physically related to “Engine RPM” DID, but unlike the
second token in 3a, it is not an exact match. The second
and third tokens matched (with opposite endianness) to “Fuel
System Status” DID, which is an enumerated DID—values
indicate a particular state, not a physical value (see [11] for
details). Significant deviation from the enumerated DID in
portions of the plot may indicate a spurious match or that
it communicates a different signal from a related system.
Finally, the plots of the token values for this AID highlight
the complexity of the translation problem, namely, similarity
in the signal variation due to the highly interrelated physical
system makes accurate translation/semantic labeling difficult.
Overall, from this capture, we find 69.6% of bits are
constant 1s or 0s, and of the remaining bits, our algorithm
matches 16.8% leaving 13.6% of bits unknown. By summing
the message scores for each AID and dividing by the number
of AIDs, we get a total match score of 14.5% out of the 16.8%
matched bits for an overall match score of 86.0%. We note
that the score should not be interpreted as the performance
of the algorithm as illustrated by Figure 3c where one can
learn correlations or related signals and infer signals that are
not DID-encoded (e.g., Figure 3c(top)). Changing α to .2, we
obtain 22.0% of the bits are matched and only 8.4% unmatched
with a total match score of 16.1% over 22.0% (72.9%). Hence,
we obtain some less direct matches but more insight into
unknown but correlated tokens.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Data transmitted over the in-vehicle CAN network is a
veritable mine of information regarding vehicular functions.
However, the key to decode CAN data, specifically the way
to tokenize and translate messages, is completely proprietary,
and varies per make, model, year and trim. Consequently, non-
OEM augmentation of vehicles is greatly hindered because it
operates blind to CAN message syntax and semantics. We de-
velop ACTT, the first algorithm to simultaneously tokenize and
translate CAN data, learning message-to-function mappings by
leveraging diagnostic information.
Our results show that ACTT both tokenizes and function-
ally translates CAN data fields providing needed meaning.
Specifically, many matched tokens reveal near-perfect DID
encodings, while remaining matched tokens are correlated to
their matched diagnostic responses providing potentially useful
groupings and facilitate actual inference of the signal (if not a
direct match) from inspection in some cases. We expect ACTT
to provide a needed step in unlocking the DBC-encodings
to enable a wide variety of after-market research including
CAN security, performance tuning, and driver or vehicle state
studies.
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